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I.
In an earlier paper published under the same title,' and to which
this paper is a sequel, the reader was reminded that the idea of indi-
vidual offences against the Law of Nations was firmly established in
countries of the common law in the eighteenth century. Piracies and
violations of ambassadorial privilege were the stock examples. Black-
stone observed characteristically that while offences against the Law
of Nations were "principally incident to whole states or nations ...
where the individuals of any state violate this general law, it is then
the interest as well as duty of the government under which they live,
to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity, that the peace
of the world may be maintained." 2 Animadversions by act of par-
liament were "not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, but
merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the king-
dom; without which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world." '
In America the opinion that such offences should be matters of
national responsibility and power ran a course in the Constitutional
Convention which may be identified with no great difficulty in the rec-
ords of debates and other contemporary sources. The examples given
were generally from Blackstone and even turns of phrase appear now
and again to have been suggested by the same authority. It is enough
for present purposes to refer once more to Randolph's enumeration
of the defects of confederation, to debates on the Virginia Plan which
Randolph presented, to the Pinckney Plan, and to the New Jersey Plan
and Madison's initial comments upon its adequacy." In the outcome,
the Constitution vested the national legislature with power "to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
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offenses against the law of nations." Madison thought that "the defi-
nition of piracies might perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the
law of nations," though he noted that a legislative definition was found
in most municipal codes.5 In the outcome, also, the judicial power
was extended to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"
(italics added) and to "all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls" (italics added), formulations broad enough
certainly to include both criminal and civil matters. That the first
Judiciary Act was intended to give the district and circuit courts of
the United States a jurisdiction of crimes at common law and under
the Law of Nations as part of the common law is supported in the
strongest terms by what we know now of the Act's legislative history.6
Had the jurisdiction been exercised initially in cases of piracy or am-
bassadorial privilege, it may be confidently surmised that there would
have been no significant opposition on the part of either lay or profes-
sional critics. As history would have it, however, the initial exercise
fell in the more debatable and the much more explosive area of offences
against neutrality. In consequence the basic questions of constitutional
power and statutory purpose were soon lost to view in the gathering
clouds of political controversy.
France was again at war with Britain and Britain's continental
allies. The political parties which were beginning to form in America
were violently partisan about everything that pertained to France.
Washington's Proclamation of April 22, 1793, brought the matter to
an issue by warning, among other things, that United States authori-
ties had been instructed to prosecute all persons "who shall, within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of nations,
with respect to the powers at war, or any of them." " Chief Justice
Jay's famous charge to the grand jury at Richmond a month later
described the laws of the United States as including, in addition to the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, the Law of Nations and
all treaties made under authority of the United States. The proclama-
tion of neutrality, said the Chief Justice, "is exactly consistent with
and declaratory of the conduct enjoined by the law of nations." ' At
Philadelphia in July, Justice Wilson delivered a charge elaborating
further upon the same theme, with many references to Blackstone and
Vattel; and at Philadelphia one Gideon Henfield was indicted and tried
before a special circuit court of the United States for enlisting on a
5. THE FEDERALIST, No. 42.
6. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Jtdiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARv. L. REv. 49, 51, 73 (1923).
7. Amr. STATE PAPERs I, 45.
8. WHARTON, STATE Tar~as, 49, 52, 54 (1849).
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French privateer.' The evidence appears to have been but slightly
disputed and the court's denunciation of the acts committed as offences
against the Law of Nations and treaties was comprehensive and em-
phatic. The jury acquitted notwithstanding. Though similar indict-
ments were returned from time to time thereafter, their basic theory
encountered an increasing popular disfavor. The national jurisdiction
of crimes at common law and under the Law of Nations had become
the subject of a bitter partisan contention between the Federalist and
the Jeffersonian parties.
When the question of a national common law of crimes ultimately
reached the Supreme Court of the United States in 1812, in a case cer-
tified from the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut, partisan-
ship had so completely beclouded the issue that neither the Attorney
General of the United States nor counsel for defendants was willing to
argue. The question was: "whether the Circuit Court of the United
States had a common law jurisdiction in cases of libel." This question
the Court, without benefit of argument, answered in the negative.
Speaking for the majority in a brief, loosely reasoned and completely
unfortified opinion, Justice Johnson said:
"The only question which this case presents is, whether the cir-
cuit courts of the United States can exercise common-law juris-
diction in criminal cases. We state it thus broadly, because a
decision in a case of libel will apply to every case in which juris-
diction is not vested in those courts by statute.
Although this question is brought up now, for the first time,
to be decided by this court, we consider it as having been long
since settled in public opinion." "0
This somewhat extraordinary process of constitutional develop-
ment by default came to full fruition four years later when the same
broad question was certified from the District of Massachusetts. The
case was an indictment for forcibly rescuing a prize from American
privateers on the high seas. 1 The question was: "whether the Cir-
cuit Court has jurisdiction over common law offences against the
United States ?" The Supreme Court was disposed to hear the ques-
tion argued, but again the Attorney General of the United States de-
clined. The whole opinion, again by Justice Johnson, was as follows:
9. Id. at 49, 59, 66, 77. See 1 WAP.Rmx, SuPamE. COURT iN UNTTm STATES
HisvoRy, 112-115 (1932).
10. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (U.S. 1812).
11. justice Story had delivered an opinion in the court below in which he sup-
ported vigorously the conclusion "that all offences within the admiralty jurisdiction
are cognizable by the Circuit Court, and in the absence of positive [statutory] law,
are punishable by fine and imprisonment.' United States v. Coolidge, 1 Gallis. 488,
497, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, 623, No. 14,858 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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"Upon the question now before the court a difference of opinion
has existed, and still exists, among the members of the Court.
We should, therefore, have been willing to have heard the ques-
tion discussed, upon solemn argument. But the attorney-general
has declined to argue the cause; and no counsel appears for the
defendant. Under these circumstances, the court would not
choose to review their former decision in the case of the United
States v. Hudson and Goodwin, or draw it into doubt. They
will, therefore, certify an opinion to the circuit court in conformity
with that decision." 
1 2
Thus the premise that individuals might offend against the Law of
Nations and become punishable in the federal courts in the administra-
tion of a federal common law of crimes, so recently affirmed by framers
of the Constitution and implemented by the draftsmen of the first Judi-
ciary Act, came to be somewhat unceremoniously abandoned. Thus
the way was prepared for the sequence of repetitious assertions in which
it was to become established that crime against the United States
is wholly statutory.
Something was saved, oddly enough, which is relevant to our
present inquiry. There must be federal legislation before there can
be federal crime; but in at least one area of international concern and
perhaps in others it is sufficient if the legislation defines by reference
to the Law of Nations. An Act of 1819 made piracy "as defined by
the law of nations" punishable with death.1" The Act was challenged
almost immediately as an insufficient exercise of the power to define.
The Supreme Court held otherwise. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Story took account of piracy in the Law of Nations and in the mari-
time and common law and concluded: " We have, therefore, no hesi-
tation in declaring, that piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon
the sea, and that it is sufficiently and constitutionally defined by the
fifth section of the act of 1819." 14
II.
While the national jurisdiction at common law of offences against
the Law of Nations was thus virtually to die a-borning, in political con-
troversies to arise soon after the national Constitution was adopted,
the reception of eighteenth century premises with respect to the law
12. United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415, 416-417 (U.S. 1816).
13. Act of March 3, 1819, c. 77, § 5, 3 STAT. 510, 513; now, with the penalty
reduced to imprisonment for life, 62 STAT. 774 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §1651 (Supp.
1952). See Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete, 38 HAxv. L. Rav. 334,
342-350 (1925). Cf. Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, §28, 1 STAT. 112, 118; now, some-
what revised, in 18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1545.
14. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 162 (U.S. 1820).
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of merchants was to lay the ground for a judicial controversy which
still projects its lights and shadows and which, in important respects,
has been vastly more confused.
It will be recalled that the law of merchants constituted a branch
of the Law of Nations, as understood by English and American law-
yers of the eighteenth century, and that as such it was assumed to
have been substantially incorporated into the common law. 5 Although
the records of debates in the Constitutional Convention are singularly
barren of express references to the law of merchants, there are indica-
tions enough that it was never entirely out of mind. It will be recalled
that the resolutions in which the Virginia Plan was first presented
proposed that the jurisdiction of inferior federal tribunals include,
along with other matters of international concern, "cases in which
foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdiction may
be interested," that the Pinckney Plan contemplated a provision for
appeals from state courts to a supreme national tribunal in all causes
wherein questions shall arise "on the Law of Nations," and that even
the New Jersey Plan would have provided for appeals from state
courts to a supreme tribunal "in all cases in which foreigners may be
interested." 16 It will be recalled further that these ideas found pre-
cise and comprehensive expression in provisions of the Constitution
defining the national judicial power and that the constitutional provi-
sions were the subject of illuminating comment in several numbers of
The Federalist, notably in numbers contributed by Hamilton and Jay.
Of the provisions for judicial power, those based upon so-called
diversity of citizenship or allegiance were implemented in the judiciary
Act of 1789 with respect to both the jurisdiction of causes and the
applicable law and in each revision or codification thereafter. From
the sources examined up to this point it is clear enough, we think,
that the implementing had two objectives: first, an assurance that
citizens of other states or foreigners need suffer nothing from local
prejudice or passion; and second, an assurance of uniform judicial
interpretation and application of laws with respect to matters of a para-
mount national concern. That matters traditionally resolved by refer-
ence to the law of merchants as part of the common law were matters
of a paramount national concern seems not to have been questioned in
15. 1 BL. CoMm. 75, 263-264 (1765); 1 WILSON, WORKS, 374-375 (Bird Wilson
ed. 1804) ; Dickinson, supra note 1, at 27; Steinmetz v. Currie, 1 Dall. 269 (U.S. 1788).
See SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND CoMMERCIAL LAW,
3-41, 125-261, 324-401 (1930).
16. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 36-38. It is of more than passing interest that,
at some stage in the Committee of Detail's consideration of the New Jersey Plan,
Wilson suggested a further detailing of the proposed appellate jurisdiction to include
all cases arising "on the Law of Nations, or general commercial or marine Laws."
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 157 (Farrand ed. 1911).
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the earlier or formative years of our national life. Indeed, there is
little or nothing in the reported decisions of the earlier years to suggest
that the question was agitated.
Then came Swift v. Tyson in 18 4 2.17 A bill of exchange dated
in Maine had been accepted by Tyson in New York and endorsed to
Swift in Maine in payment of an antecedent debt. Swift, citizen of
Maine, sued Tyson, citizen of New York, in a federal court in New
York; and Tyson defended that he had been imposed upon by the
drawer's fraud and that under New York decisions Swift, having
taken in payment of an antecedent debt, could not be regarded as a bona
fide holder for value. On a certificate of division from the lower
court, the question before the Supreme Court was whether evidence
of the drawer's fraud was admissible against Swift. More broadly
stated, the question was whether the issue as to Swift's position as
endorsee in payment of an antecedent debt was to be resolved under
national commercial law whatever the true import of local New York
decisions might be. The arguments of counsel ranged widely and
included some extreme contentions. Counsel for plaintiff relied upon
national commerciallaw and advanced the contention, among others,
that the phrase "laws of the several states" in Section 34 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 referred only to "the written constitutional system
and statutes of such states." 18 This proposition was of course a good
deal more than plaintiff needed to prove. Counsel for defendant denied
the existence of a national common law in commercial matters and
for this contention relied, oddly enough, upon the cases which already
had denied the existence of a national common lav of crimes. 9 This
was a straining of dubious analogy, to say the least. The Supreme
Court was unanimous in answering the question certified in the nega-
tive. Whatever the local case law might be-and on this matter it
was assumed that there might be doubt-the question was one to be
resolved under "general commercial law." Under this law, said justice
Story for the Court, "we have no hesitation in saying, that a pre-
existing debt does constitute a valuable consideration . . .as applicable
to negotiable instruments." 20
This was what the Court decided and all that it decided.2 It
would have been enough to add that cases arising under the law of
merchants or "general commercial law" were not cases in which "the
17. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
18. Id. at 3, 5, 8.
19. Id. at 9, 11.
20. Id. at 19.
21. Justice Story said: "the only real question in the cause is, whether, under
the circumstances of the present case, such a pre-existing debt constitutes a valuable
consideration, in the sense of the general rule applicable to negotiable instruments."
Id. at 16.
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laws of the several states" were intended to apply, as constitutional and
legislative history would amply demonstrate. Unhappily, Justice Story
was persuaded to respond to the arguments of counsel in a confusion
of comment upon history which was luminous, so far as it went, and
of comment upon the meaning of Section 34 which was anything but
illuminating. In anticipation of the confusion to follow, his opinion
at this point must be quoted at some length. Commenting upon the
meaning of Section 34, he said:
"In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that
the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only
evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws.
... The laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the
rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority there-
of, or long-established local customs having the force of laws. In all
the various cases, which have hitherto come before us for decision,
this court have uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation
of the 34th section limited its application to state laws, 'strictly
local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the
construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights
and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the
rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and
intra territorial in their nature and character. It never has been
supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to
apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent
upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent oper-
ation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts
or other written instruments, and especially to questions of gen-
eral commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to
perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon
general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition
of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished
by the principles of commercial law to govern the case. And we
have not now the slightest difficulty in holding, that this section,
upon its true intendment and construction, is strictly limited to
local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and
does not extend to contracts and other instruments of a commer-
cial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be
sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the gen-
eral principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence . ..
The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared
in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in
Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the
law of a single country only, but of the commercial world. Non erit
alia lex Romra, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud
omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eademque le% obtenebit." 22
22. Id. at 18-19. Justice Story was here taking his Cicero from Mansfield, who
probably quoted from memory. Cf. Justice Story's quotation of the same lines from
the original (De Republica, Lib. III, xxii) in his earlier and abler admiralty opinion
in De Lovio v. Boit, infra at note 47.
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With so confused an exegesis to guide, the courts were bound to
have difficulty in finding their way through the maze of questions cer-
tain to arise in a nation organized on federal principles. Difficulty
began almost immediately. At the same term, the Supreme Court
ruled in an opinion by Justice Story that the construction of a policy
of fire insurance on a New York factory presented "questions of gen-
eral commercial law." ' The point may have been arguable, but there
was more and worse to come. The country was becoming increasingly
absorbed in westward expansion and internal development. The law
of merchants for most lawyers was fast slipping into the limbo of
forgotten history. The clash of words over national versus state power
was moving steadily toward the ultimate clash of arms. In such a
climate, the Supreme Court was to cultivate, stoutly maintain and
even expand an utterly untenable position with respect to the law
applicable in the federal courts in diversity cases. It soon ceased to
be a question of conserving intended national law in matters of inter-
national concern, as in the controversy over a national common law
with respect to crimes; rather it became a question of conserving the
common law of the several states in areas where no paramount national
law had ever been intended.
Before the Civil War, the Supreme Court had indicated that it
would accord "respect" but not controlling effect to applicable local
decisions concerning the construction of a clause in the will of a
Mississippi testator devising Mississippi land,"4 the construction of a
reservation or condition in a deed of land in Maine,2" and the question
of an owner's responsibility for the negligence of his independent con-
tractor in excavating premises abutting on a Chicago street .2  Already,
within two decades, the Court's formula descriptive of the federal law,
assumed to be controlling in the federal courts in diversity cases, had
metamorphosed from "general commercial law" into "general law"
into "common law." After the Civil War and before the century ran
out, the same Court was to become similarly committed with respect
to a question of dedication to public use of land suitable for a wharf
site on or under a navigable river,27 a question as to the validity of a
statutory authorization of local taxation in aid of railroad construc-
23. Carpenter v. Provident Washington Insurance Co., 16 Pet. 495, 511 (U.S.
1842).
24. Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464, 476 (U.S. 1845). Justice McKinley filed a
vigorous dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Taney concurred.
25. Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353, 379 (U.S. 1846).
26. Chicago City v. Robbins, 2 Black 418, 428 (U.S. 1862).
27. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 506 (U.S. 1870).
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tion,28 a question as to the validity of a railroad's stipulation against
liability for negligent injury to one travelling on a drover's pass,2 9 a
question as to the applicability of the fellow-servant doctrine as
between a railroad fireman and his engineer, 30 and other matters of a
comparable local concern.
The particular cases to which reference is here made, by way of
illustration, are those which a majority of the Supreme Court were to
note as their principal reliance a generation later in deciding Black and
White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co.3 Two Ken-
tucky taxicab companies were in controversy concerning access to the
premises of a Kentucky railroad company to solicit patronage. Con-
tracts for exclusive access were invalid under the Kentucky decisions.
Accordingly, the complaining company reincorporated in Tennessee,
procured from the railroad an exclusive contract, and then invoked
the diversity jurisdiction of the local federal court to enjoin its rival
from interfering. The injunction was granted and the Supreme Court
affirmed. In the view of the majority, it was a question of general
common law. Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissented. The
prevailing doctrine had been accepted upon a fallacy never analyzed,
said Justice Holmes, and the fallacy had resulted in "an unconstitu-
tional assumption of power by the Courts of the United States which
no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate
to correct." "I should leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed," Justice
Holmes concluded, "but I would not allow it to spread the assumed
dominion into new fields." "2
Spread of the assumed dominion, initiated originally in reliance
upon Justice Story's extraordinary digression in Swift v. Tyson, had
now reached a stage at which reconsideration was rather obviously
overdue. As such matters move in our supreme tribunal, reconsidera-
tion came promptly. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, a suit brought
in a federal court in New York to recover for personal injuries suffered
in Pennsylvania, the case turned upon the measure of a railroad's lia-
28. Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 689-690 (U.S. 1872). Chief Justice
Chase and Justices Miller and Davis dissented.
29. Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 367-368 (U.S. 1873). See
also Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U.S.
397, 443 (1889). This latter case turned on the validity of a stipulation against
liability for cargo damage attributable to the master's negligence in an ocean bill
of lading. It was a libel in personam in admiralty and the argument based upon
judicial proliferations of Swift v. Tyson was of course completely irrelevant.
30. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370 (1893). On
this occasion Justice Field confessed his earlier errors and filed a long and devastating
dissent.
31. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
32. Id. at 532-533, 535.
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bility to a plaintiff who had been struck by something projecting from
a passing freight train while he was walking along the railroad's right
of way on a dark night. Was this a question to be resolved, in the
exercise of diversity jurisdiction, under local or general law? The
lower federal courts sustained a recovery in reliance upon general law.
The Supreme Court reversed, two justices dissenting. 3
"The question for decision," said Justice Brandeis for the major-
ity, "is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now
be disapproved." Justice Brandeis made no distinction between what
was actually decided in the case and what was said in discourse about
the meaning of Section 34. He began the substantive part of his
opinion by attributing to the case, not what it decided, but rather what
its proliferations had come to mean in the intervening years. He said:
"Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18, held that federal courts exercising juris-
diction on the ground of diversity of citizenship need not, in matters
of general- jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the State as de-
clared by its highest court; that they are free to exercise an independ-
ent judgment as to what the common law of the State is-or should
be. . . . " Doubts had been expressed repeatedly over the years and
more recently it had been established that "the purpose of the section
was merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which
some federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdic-
tion in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of deci-
sion the law of the State, unwritten as well as written." 3 4  The so-
called "doctrine of Swift v. Tyson" had not produced uniformity of
state decisions. On the contrary, it had developed "a new well of
uncertainties" and had prevented "uniformity in the administration of
the law of the State."
"In disapproving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional
§ 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of
Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this
Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our
opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States." "
It would serve no present purpose to examine in detail the after-
math of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. There has been a spate of
litigation and professional comment in corresponding volume.3 To
33. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
34. Id. at 69, 71, 72. Eere the reference was to Warren, mtpra note 6, at 51-52,
81-88, 108.
35. 304 U.S. 74-75, 79-80.
36. See Wollin, Conflict of Laws in the Federal Courts: Thirteen Years of
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 3 SYRAcusE L. REv. 47 (1951).
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date it has been the evident concern of the Supreme Court to assure
that all matters outside the scope of a paramount national law or policy
shall be resolved in substantially the same way whether prosecuted in
a state court or in a federal court in the exercise of diversity jurisdic-
tion. Even cases turning upon interstate conflict of laws, including
cases in which the usual conflict of laws solution is barred by a strongly
held local policy, have yielded to this concern. 7 At the same time
the Supreme Court has been obliged to remind a seemingly somewhat
bewildered bar that where the Constitution contemplates a paramount
national law or policy the laws of the several states are inapplicable
and that it makes no difference whether the issue is presented in a
diversity case or in a case arising under some other grant of national
judicial power. On the same day that the Erie case was decided, the
Court decided another case which had been taken up on certiorari to
a state court and which presented a question of equitable apportion-
ment pursuant to interstate compact of the waters of a stream flowing
through two states. For the Court, Justice Brandeis said, "whether
the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two
States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the
statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." 3  Four
years later, again on certiorari to a state court, the Supreme Court re-
solved a conflict between state and national law with respect to a ship-
owner's burden of proof when relying upon a seaman's release in a
suit for damages under the Jones Act and for maintenance and cure.
Said Justice Black for the Court: "The source of the governing law
applied is in the national, not the state, government." 39
Some may have anticipated that there would be less difficulty
where national legislation has occupied the field. It has not been so.
In a number of cases arising under federal statutes the Supreme Court
has found itself obliged to stress firmly a paramount national law or
policy and to warn against becoming involved in the implications of
Erie. 40 A case of even more compelling interest, among other reasons
because it involved no particular exercise of a national legislative
power, is Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. The case originated
in a federal court and presented a question as to the delay which will
37. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941);
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
38. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1938).
39. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942).
40. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 315
U.S. 447 (1942); Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 324 U.S. 392 (1946); Vanston Bond-
holders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946) ; Note, 30 ORE. L. REv.
164 (1951).
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bar reimbursement of the United States as drawee of a government
check on which the payee's endorsement has been forged. For the
Court, Justice Douglas said:
"We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the rule
of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, does not apply to this
action. The rights and duties of the United States on commer-
cial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local
law. When the United States disburses its funds or pays its
debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power. . . . In
absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts
to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own stand-
ards...
. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain. And
while the federal law merchant, developed for about a century
under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, represented general
commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to
protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient source
of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these fed-
eral questions." 41
So the federal law merchant is still useful when it comes to the
fashioning of a federal rule to protect a federal right; and one may
think of other areas in which in all likelihood there is a persisting vital-
ity. As general commercial law in the federal courts in diversity cases,
however, it would appear to be quite dead. No case quite like Swift v.
Tyson has reached the Supreme Court since Erie was decided; but
when it does, if ever, it is to be anticipated that the rule of the earlier
case will go the way of its more famous dictum. The law of mer-
chants had vitality as universal law in the eighteenth century. The
more learned of the lawyer-delegates to the Constitutional Convention
anticipated for it a continuing and uniform progress in the United
States as part of the national law. Assurance of such progress was
one of the objectives of diversity jurisdiction. But diversities of state
citizenship have long since ceased to be as meaningful as they once
were. The need for uniformity in the commercial field has been largely
met by the now familiar device of uniform state laws. In writing finis
to the judicial overreaching which followed its earlier decision, it seems
clear enough that the Supreme Court has written finis also to the
eighteenth century premise upon which Swift v. Tyson was once
securely based.
III.
The reception in America of eighteenth century premises with
respect to the law maritime is another and a quite different story.
41. 318 U.S. 363, 366-367 (1943).
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There were a number of reasons why this branch of the Law of
Nations would progress in the United States with emphasis upon its
supremacy and uniformity as part of the national law. Of the entire
body of law and practice considered international in the eighteenth
century, the law maritime was at least as old if not older than any
other; it was in important respects the most coherent; and in many
respects it was the most comprehensive.42 With such departures as
were attributable generally to local needs or conditions, it had come
to be respected wherever seaborne trade was a prime concern. It had
become established long since as a part of the law of England, where
the wide range of its sources, the peculiar liberality of its procedures,
the specialized competence required of its practitioners and the zeal-
ously guarded jurisdiction which its separate court had been able to
retain in contests with the common law had combined to give it a unique
identity. Englishmen adventuring in maritime commerce had taken
it with them into English colonies overseas. In America, prior to the
Revolution, there had been a considerable experience with the subject
in admiralty or other courts in the seaport cities; and in America,
when independence was achieved, maritime commerce was "the jug-
ular vein of the Thirteen States." '
Maritime causes, both criminal and civil, received a good deal of
attention in the Constitutional Convention and the "need for a body of
law applicable throughout the nation was recognized by every shade
of opinion." The desirability of independent lower federal courts of
admiralty "found general concurrence or, at least, did not encounter
vigorous opposition even from the Anti-Federalists." " In the Con-
stitution as drafted and adopted, the whole range of maritime matters
was covered adequately in provisions for the national legislative and
judicial power. The judicial power was implemented immediately and
in terms which made it exclusively national except as the Judiciary
Act saved to suitors in civil causes "the right of a common law remedy
where the common law is competent to give it." Obviously there
would be difficult peripheral problems, with respect to both the juris-
diction of courts and the governing law, wherever land law meets the
sea; but it is quite as obvious that the main course had been charted
clearly.
42. See SANBORN, op. cit. supra note 15. Sanborn says (at 19): "Indeed it
cannot be too strongly emphasized that throughout classical antiquity, through thel
Dark and Middle Ages, and until comparatively recent times the greatest characteris-
tic of maritime law has been that its uniform provisions were known and enforced
in every seaport of every nation."
43. See FRANXFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SuPREME COURT, 7
(1927) and references there cited.
44. Id. at 7, 8.
THE LAW OF NATIONS
Within four years after the new government was inaugurated, in
his individual opinion in the famous case of Chisholm v. Georgia,4"
Chief Justice Jay found occasion to undertake a "cursory view of the
judicial powers of the United States." These powers included "all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," said the Chief Justice,
"because, as the seas are the joint property of nations, whose rights
and privileges relative thereto, are regulated by the law of nations and
treaties, such cases necessarily belong to national jurisdiction." Every
lawyer knows of Chisholm v. Georgia and of its denouement in the
Eleventh Amendment.4" Perhaps fewer know that the Chief Justice's
dictum concerning admiralty epitomized a view which had prevailed
in the Convention and which continued to accord with the more gen-
eral understandings of bench and bar. The great contests which would
arise as cases required the application of general understandings in
particular situations would come later. In the period between the
adoption of the Constitution and the Civil War, these contests would
be concerned chiefly with the content and the areas of judicial juris-
diction in maritime matters.
Sitting on circuit in 1815, Justice Story was confronted with
the question whether a policy of marine insurance was a maritime
contract cognizable in admiralty. He undertook "a thorough exam-
ination of the whole jurisdiction of the admiralty," rejected the more
restricted view which had come to prevail in England at the time the
Constitution was adopted, and concluded that marine insurance was
maritime. He said in summary:
"The language of the constitution will therefore warrant the
most liberal interpretation; and it may not be unfit to hold, that
it had reference to that maritime jurisdiction, which commercial
convenience, public policy, and national rights, have contributed
to establish, with slight local differences, over all Europe; that
jurisdiction, which, under the name of consular courts, first estab-
lished itself upon the shores of the Mediterranean, and, from the
general equity and simplicity of its proceedings, soon commended
itself to all the maritime states; that jurisdiction, in short, which,
collecting the wisdom of the civil law, and combining it with the
customs and usages of the sea, produced the venerable Consolato
del Mare, and still continues in its decisions to regulate the com-
merce, the intercourse, and the warfare of mankind. . . . Of
this great system of maritime law it may be truly said, 'Non
erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et
45. 2 Dall. 419, 475 (U.S. 1793).
46. 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 9, 93-102.
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omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna et immor-
talis, continebit.' "47
A generation was to pass before a comparable issue would reach
the Supreme Court in New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Mer-
chants' Bank. In this case the principal question was whether a con-
tract for the carriage of goods by sea was maritime and so within the
grant of admiralty jurisdiction. Was the grant to be read with ref-
erence to the restricted authority of the English admiralty at the time
the Constitution was adopted; or, as Justice Story had contended in
De Lovio v. Boit, with reference to the more enlarged authority of
maritime courts that had existed then and since in other maritime coun-
tries? History was explored and the question was argued and rear-
gued at great length. A sharply divided Court sustained the more
enlarged jurisdiction and held the affreightment contract maritime, a
view which has since prevailed. The grant was intended to be com-
prehensive as well as exclusive. The federal court was "a maritime
court instituted for the purpose of administering the law of the seas."4
At its. previous term the Supreme Court had resolved another
great admiralty case, quite as sharply contested as the one just
reviewed, in which the waters within the admiralty power were at
issue. It was a libel in rem in admiralty arising out of a collision on
the Mississippi River nearly a hundred miles above New Orleans. If
restrictive English precedents persisting throughout the eighteenth
century had been followed, the Court would have been constrained to
say that the collision had occurred infra corpus comitatus and so
within the jurisdiction of the common law courts. However, in this
case, reported as Waring v. Clarke, a majority of the Court concluded
"that the grant of admiralty power to the courts of the United States
was not intended to be limited or to be interpreted by what were cases
of admiraly jurisdiction in England when the constitution was
adopted." Rather it was to be interpreted in accordance with "the
general admiralty law." Accordingly the admiralty jurisdiction was
sustained.4 9
47. De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. 398, 472, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 443, No. 3,776 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815). When the precise question was finally presented to the Supreme
Court fifty-five years later, Justice Story's opinion was praised as "a monument of
his great erudition" and his conclusion as to policies of marine insurance was ap-
proved as correct. Insurance Company v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 35 (U.S. 1870).
48. 6 How. 344, 392 (U.S. 1848). Chief Justice Taney and Justices McLean
and Wayne appear to have concurred with Justice Nelson in support of the more
enlarged view. Justices Catron and Woodbury reached the same result by treating
the case as essentially one of maritime tort. Justice Daniel dissented in support
of the more restricted view.
49. 5 How. 441, 459 (U.S. 1847). Justice Woodbury wrote a long and learned
dissent, in which Justices Daniel and Grier concurred, arguing for the restrictive
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An expanding conception of the scope of the admiralty power was
soon to receive its most significant application in the last of the great
cases of the period before the Civil War. In an earlier and insuffi-
ciently considered case, the Court had followed English precedents lim-
iting the admiralty jurisdiction to tidewater.5" By an Act of 1845
Congress had extended admiralty jurisdiction to vessels of twenty tons
and upward employed in navigation between ports of different states
on the interior lakes and navigable connecting waters. 51 The constitu-
tionality of the Act was attacked in The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, a libel in rem in a case of collision on Lake Ontario. In a
truly notable opinion, Chief Justice Taney repudiated the earlier deci-
sion, accepted navigability rather than tidewater as the test best
adapted to the needs of a country having "thousands of miles of public
navigable water, including lakes and rivers in which there is no tide,"
and sustained the constitutionality of the Act of 1845 so completely as
to render it superfluous. Of the waters on which the collision had
occurred, he said:
"These lakes are in truth inland seas. Different States border
on them on one side, and a foreign nation on the other. A great
and growing commerce is carried on upon them between different
States and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents
and hazards that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets
have encountered on them, and prizes been made; and every
reason which existed for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the
general government on the Atlantic seas, applies with equal force
to the lakes. There is an equal necessity for the instance and for
the prize power of the admiralty court to administer international
law, and if the one cannot be established neither can the other." 2
So the way was cleared in the years before the Civil War for a
liberal view of the admiralty's jurisdiction of contract and related
English view. Had the collision occurred on the high seas, he conceded, it would
have been governed by "the admiralty and sea laws of all nations." But it had
occurred within the body of a county, between river steamers employed in local
trade, "and should no more be tried without a jury, and decided by the laws of
Oleron and Wisbuy, or the Consulat del Mare, or the Black Book of Admiralty,
than a collision between two wagoners in the same county." Id. at 467, 472, 499.
50. The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat 428 (U.S. 1825). It is one of the un-
explained paradoxes of Justice Story's judicial career that he should have been the
author of the opinion in this case. In the Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903),
Justice Brown observed (at 25) : "The opinion is a brief one by Mr. Justice Story,
and contains little more than the announcement of the general principle, and with
no attempt to distinguish the English cases. It lacks wholly any display of the
abundant learning which ten years before had characterized his celebrated opinion
in De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; S.C., Fed. Cas. No. 3776."
51. 5 STAT. 726 (1845).
52. 12 How. 443, 453, 454 (U.S. 1851). Justice Daniel dissented. Further
see Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How. 296 (U.S. 1857) ; The Eagle, 8 Wall.
15 (U.S. 1868).
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matters, a view which would bear slight resemblance to the restricted
horizons of the English admiralty at the time the Constitution was
adopted, but which would conform substantially to an outlook generally
approved in other maritime countries. So, in the same period, the
areas of admiralty power in the United States came to be defined
liberally, in reliance upon a criterion better adapted to conditions in
the United States, and again in harmony with views generally approved
in other maritime countries."' Lord Coke was repudiated, the tide-
water test discarded, and the way cleared to bring within admiralty
jurisdiction waters navigable in fact whenever or wherever it might
become necessary to consider waters as an area of admiralty authority.
Immediately after the Civil War, in two important cases, the
Supreme Court fortified further the law maritime as paramount and
uniform national law by ruling that the proceeding in rem in a maritime
cause is characteristically and exclusively maritime and is accordingly
denied the state courts, the saving clause notwithstanding. In The
Moses Taylor, a state judgment in a suit in rem for breach of a contract
of passenger carriage by sea, prosecuted locally in reliance upon a
California statute, was reversed on writ of error; " and in The Hine
v. Trevor the same fate befell a state judgment in another suit in rem,
prosecuted in reliance upon an Iowa statute, in a case of collision on
the Mississippi River.55 The contract was maritime in the one case;
the tort was maritime in the other. The remedy was exclusively
maritime in each.56
Thus the great contests concerning the content and scope of the
admiralty jurisdiction and the admiralty's unique and exclusive
procedure were waged and won within approximately the first seventy-
five years of our national life. The venerable corpus of the law mari-
time, thus judicially acknowledged as a part of our national law, would
be further elucidated in its substantive requirements, further fortified
against local encroachments, and eventually much supplemented by
national legislation responsive to modem needs. Ultimately, indeed,
there would be an occasional recourse to treaties with other maritime
53. To what has been said above, it should be added that most of the restrictions
on the early English admiralty were removed by legislation in the nineteenth century.
54. 4 Wall. 411 (U.S. 1866).
55. 4 Wall. 555 (U.S. 1866).
56. "The result of the decision was to deprive the State Courts, especially in the
West, of an immense class of.cases relating to maritime contracts, collisions and
other torts, over which they had hitherto exercised jurisdiction." 2 WARa=N, op.
cit. supra note 9, at 415. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903) is a notable
decision in the same line. One historic exception has since been recognized where the
state statute authorized an in rem proceeding to forfeit for violation of local fishery
regulations. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943). See Dickinson
and Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty in. the Supreme Co-art of the United States,
36 CAIn. L. REv. 169, 172 (1948).
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nations as the unifying and supplementing process proceeded. While
there is no space here for detail, a few of the more noteworthy instances
or examples may be reported.
It was about the time of our Civil War that, on British initiative,
the United States and an impressive number of other maritime countries
adopted identic regulations for preventing collisions at sea. The Scotia
was a case of collision on the high seas between a British and a United
States vessel in which, if the identic regulations were applicable, the
United States vessel was clearly at fault. For the American owners
it was argued that the regulations were mere national laws, applicable
severally to national ships, but necessarily inapplicable to an interna-
tional collision. This argument the Supreme Court rejected. Said
Justice Strong for a unanimous Court:
"Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the sea.
That law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two
nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of
nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities.
It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power,
but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct.
Whatever may have been its origin, whether in the usages of
navigation or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both,
it has become the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction
of those nations who may be said to constitute the commercial
world."
So it was that the ancient usages and the classical codes became of
universal obligation. "It is evident," Justice Strong continued, "that
unless general assent is efficacious to give sanction to international law,
there never can be that growth and development of maritime rules
which the constant changes in the instruments and necessities of naviga-
tion require." The regulations for preventing collisions at sea had
received a general assent. They governed the case. The opinion
concluded:
"This is not giving to the statutes of any nation extra-
territorial effect. It is not treating them as general maritime laws,
but it is recognition of the historical fact that by common consent
of mankind, these rules have been acquiesced in as of general
obligation. Of that fact we think we may take judicial notice.
Foreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is
not so with the law of nations." 17
A few years later it fell to the lot of Justice Bradley to elaborate
upon the same underlying ideas in what may be described fairly as a
57. 14 Wall. 170, 187, 188 (U.S. 1871).
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classical statement of the American maritime tradition. Fifty-five
years earlier, in one of his inexplicable lapses, Justice Story had ruled
summarily for the Court that there is no lien for repairs and necessaries
furnished in the home port. 8 State legislatures had enacted a miscel-
lany of statutes to fill the gap. While the liens thus created were
ultimately to be denied in rem enforcement in the state courts, they
were recognized and given effect in the admiralty courts at an early
date.59 The Supreme Court had vacillated in its formulation of a
relevant rule of admiralty practice, first providing for the enforcement
of such liens by a proceeding in rem in 1844, then denying such enforce-
ment in a revised rule of 1859, and finally restoring the earlier practice
in a further revision of 1872.60 About a year before the latter revision
became effective, claim to a lien for repairs and necessaries furnished
in the home port was interposed in an admiralty proceeding in the
federal court in Louisiana. Since the claimant had failed to record as
the local statute required, and since the Admiralty Rule in force at the
time authorized only a proceeding in personam, the claimant had no
case. However, claimant urged strongly on appeal that the earlier
decision should be reconsidered and overruled and thus presented what
the Supreme Court chose to regard as "the principal question in the
case."
The case was The Lottawanna. Arguing that the earlier case of
The General Smith should be overruled, counsel elaborated upon the
thesis that "the maritime law is part of the law of nations," that its
universality is one of its "great beauties," and that uniformity had been
declared to be its essence. Though obviously impressed, the majority
for which Justice Bradley spoke concluded that the old rule had been
relied upon too long as a rule of property and that if the inconveniences
resulting from "the often intricate and conflicting state laws" were to
be corrected it must be by act of Congress. Justice Bradley's opinion
merits quotation at greater length than our space permits. He said
in part:
"But it is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law
is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by
the laws and usages of that country. In this respect it is like
international law or the laws of war, which have the effect of law
in no country any further than they are accepted and received as
such; . . .Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law
is the same in all commercial countries, yet, in each country,
58. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438 (U.S. 1819). Cf. De Lovio v. Boit,
supra note 47; and see supra note 50.
59. See Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324 (U.S. 1833).
60. See 21 Wall. 560, 562 (U.S. 1874).
THE LAW OF NATIONS
peculiarities exist either as to some of the rules, or in the mode
of enforcing them. Especially is this the case on the outside
boundaries of the law, where it comes in contact with, or shades
off into the local or municipal law of the particular country and
affects only its own merchants or people in their relations to each
other. Whereas, in matters affecting the stranger or foreigner,
the commonly received law of the whole commercial world is
more assiduously observed-as, in justice, it should be. No one
doubts that every nation may adopt its own maritime code.
France may adopt one; England another; and the United States
a third; still, the convenience of the commercial world, bound
together, as it is, by mutual relations of trade and intercourse,
demands that in all essential things wherein those relations bring
them in contact, there should be a uniform law founded on natural
reason and justice. Hence the adoption by all commercial nations
(our own included) of the general maritime law as the basis and
groundwork of all their maritime regulations. . . . And thus it
happens, that, from the general practice of commercial nations in
making the same general law the basis and groundwork of their
respective maritime systems, the great mass of maritime law which
is thus received by these nations in common, comes to be the
common maritime law of the world.
"... One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution
must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and
operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not
have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime
law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that
would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character af-
fecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign
states." 61
Justice Bradley's observations with respect to the Constitutional
mandate were implemented firmly some fifty years later, though only
after a prolonged contest, in a sequence of important decisions excluding
the application of state workmen's compensation statutes in cases of
maritime injury. Seamen had their ancient right to "maintenance and
cure" and would soon have modern employers' liability under the Jones
Act. But longshoremen and other harbor workers, a hardworking
class of men employed in a hazardous occupation, had nothing com-
parable. The larger proportion of them were normally employed in
fact on both land and water. In Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen,
a stevedore driving a loaded electric truck off a ship was killed in an
accident at the ship's end of the gangway. New York courts approved
61. 21 Wall. 558, 572-575 (1874). Justices Clifford and Field dissented. Most
of the inconveniences were corrected by the Maritime Lien Act of 1910. 36 STAT.
604, as amended by an Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 988, 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1946).
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an award of compensation under the state statute. On writ of error,
the Supreme Court reversed. Compensation was not a "common law
remedy" within the meaning of the saving clause. The award was an
invasion of admiralty's exclusive jurisdiction and an impairment of
the uniformity of national maritime law. Referring to the constitu-
tional grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article 3, section 2, and to
the "necessary and proper" clause in Article 1, section 8, Justice Mc-
Reynolds for the majority said:
"Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as
settled doctrine that in consequence of these provisions Congress
has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which
shall prevail throughout the country. . . . And further, that in
the absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law
as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national
law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."
After quoting from Justice Bradley's opinion in The Lottawanna,
Justice McReynolds continued:
"It would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness
just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified,
or affected by state legislation. That this may be done to some
extent cannot be denied .... Equally well established is the rule
that state statutes may not contravene an applicable act of Con-
gress or affect the general maritime law beyond certain limits.
... And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contra-
venes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or
works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.
This limitation, at the least, is essential to the effective operation
of the fundamental purposes for which such law was incorporated
into our national laws by the Constitution itself." 2
Congress responded to the Jensen decision, not by enacting such
a general statute as the Court had virtually invited it to enact, but by
amending the saving clause to save to claimants "the rights and remedies
under the workmen's compensation law of any State." ' This amend-
62. 244 U.S. 205, 215, 216 (1917). Justices Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis and Clarke
dissented. Justice Holmes thought that in the silence of Congress "the wholly
inadequate maritime law of the time of the Constitution" should be supplemented
from the statute or common law of the states. Justice Pitney developed at length
the thesis that common law courts had been left a concurrent jurisdiction and that
admiralty and common law courts should apply each their own substantive law in
resolving a maritime case. Justices Brandeis and Clarke concurred in both dissenting
opinions.
63. 40 STAT. 395 (1917).
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ment the Supreme Court promptly held an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the states and an unconstitutional impairment of
"the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution not only con-
templated but actually established." Speaking for the majority in
Knickerbocker Ice Company v. Stewart, Justice McReynolds said:
"We think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress. Its
pover to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the
maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their enforcement, arises
from the Constitution, as above indicated. The definite object of
the grant was to commit direct control to the Federal Government;
to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and dis-
advantages incident to discordant legislation; and to establish, so
far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable
throughout every part of the Union." "'
Once more the Congress reacted by adding claims to compensation
under local statutes to the saving clause. The new amendment, except
as it excluded compensation for injuries to or death of "the master or
members of the crew of a vessel," was substantially like the old."5
This exclusion proved wholly insufficient to meet the Court's objection
to the prior enactment. Said Justice McReynolds for the majority in
State of Washington v. Dawson & Company: "the doctrine of Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, to which we adhere, permits no other
conclusion." The opinion concluded:
"This cause presents a situation where there was no attempt
to prescribe general rules. On the contrary, the manifest purpose
was to permit any State to alter the maritime law and thereby
introduce conflicting requirements. To prevent this result the
Constitution adopted the law of the sea as the measure of maritime
rights and obligations. The confusion and difficulty, if vessels
were compelled to comply with the local statutes at every port,
are not difficult to see. Of course, some within the States may
prefer local rules; but the Union was formed with the very definite
design of freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions
incident to such control. The subject is national. Local
interests must yield to the common welfare. The Constitution is
supreme." 6"
After the decision in State of Washington v. Dawson & Co. the
Congress turned, as we may now see that it should have turned in the
64. 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920). Justices Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis aid Clarke
again dissented.
65. 42 STAT. 634 (1922).
66. 264 1.S. 219, 228 (1924). Justice Holmes would have been glad to see a
limit set to the principle of the Jensen case, but left it "to those who think the
principle right to say how far it extends." Only Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting
opinion. His dissent, in its twentieth century setting, was in some respects remi-
niscent of to the more notable admiralty dissents of an earlier period.
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first instance, to the enactment of a national compensation statute
responsive to the requirement of uniformity upon which the Supreme
Court had insisted. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act of 1927 67 stopped short of providing a comprehen-
sive system for the maritime workers concerned. Its coverage was
restricted to disability or death resulting from "an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry-
dock)" and then only if recovery "through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." Within its
scope, however, it was national and uniform. Location case by case
of the line between national and state authority was left to the courts.
There would be a multiplicity of peripheral problems, needless to say,
as well as problems of interpretation." For present purposes it is
enough to note that the statute withstood all attacks upon its consti-
tutionality. Said Chief Justice Hughes for the Court: "the general
authority of the Congress to alter or revise the maritime law which
shall prevail throughout the country is beyond dispute." 69
Here it should be interpolated that much of the more recent prog-
ress of the maritime law has been achieved through national legislation.
The Limited Liability Act of 1851, 70 the Harter Act of 1893 7' and
the Federal Maritime Lien Act of 1910,2 among others, had antedated
the Jensen controversy. While the controversy precipitated by the
Jensen decision was at its height, the Congress was engaged in bringing
to enactment the Merchant Marine Act of 1920," the Death on the
High Seas Act of 1920,"4 and the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920."5 Later
legislation, like much of the earlier, has been part of a continuing effort
to keep maritime law abreast of the needs of seaborne commerce and
also to develop it in harmony with the laws of other maritime
countries.7" In a number of instances there has been recourse to the
67. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927).
68. See Dickinson and Andrews, supra note 56, at 176-182.
69. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39 (1932).
70. 9 STAT. 635 (1851). There is report of some interesting history in Norwich
Company v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104 (U.S. 1871).
71. 27 STAT. 445 (1893).
72. 36 STAT. 604 (1910). This legislation was revised slightly and re-enacted
as part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. 41 STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 861
(1946).
73. 41 STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1946). Section 33 of this statute
is the so-called Jones Act which provides employers' liability for seamen. On the
constitutionality of the Jones Act and its effect upon local law, see Panama Railroad
Company v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) ; Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38
(1930) ; and O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 31 (1943).
74. 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1946).
75. 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §921 (1946).
76. For a notable example, see the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, 49
STAT. 1207 (1937), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1946).
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treaty-making power to round out the effort.7 7  Since the subject-
matter has been international for more than two thousand years, and
in the United States is committed in its entirety to the national govern-
ment, there has been and could be no serious question as to the propriety
of such recourse.
This part of our study may be concluded appropriately with a note
of the Supreme Court's response to an attack upon the constitutionality
of the Ship Mortgage Act mentioned above. The attack was aimed
at the broad range of the statute and fortified by the circumstance that
the Court had ruled, in one of its earlier and less considered opinions,
that a ship mortgage is not maritime.7 ' To encourage investment in
shipping and shipping securities, the new statute made such mortgages
maritime and defined their priorities with meticulous care, all without
limitation upon the use which might be made of the proceeds of loans
thus secured. Issues as to constitutionality were presented in suits in
admiralty to foreclose two ship mortgages the proceeds of which had
been largely applied for non-maritime purposes, The constitutionality
of the Act was sustained in reliance upon the grant of judicial power
with respect to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" and
the legislative power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper." The Court did not overlook a suggestion in the earlier
opinion that there might be legislative power. Speaking for a unani-
mous Court, Chief justice Hughes said:
"... the grant presupposed a 'general system of maritime law'
which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country,
and contemplated a body of law with uniform operation .... The
framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that the maritime
law should remain unalterable. The purpose was to place the
entire subject, including its substantive as well as its procedural
features, under national control. . . The Congress thus has
paramount power to determine the maritime law which shall pre-
vail throughout the country." 79
77. See CONVNTIO N RELATING TO ASSISTANCE AND SALVAGE AT SEA (1910) 37
STAT. 1658; CONVENTION AND REGULATIONS FOR PROMOTING SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA
(1929) 50 STAT. 1121; CONVENTION ESTABLISHING LOAD LINES TO SHIPS OF INTER-
NATIONAL VOYAGE (1930) 47 STAT. 2228; CONVENTION RESPECTING OFFICERS'
COIPErENcY CERTIFICATES (1936) 54 STAT. 1683; CONVENTION RESPECTING SHIP-
oWNERS' LIABILITY IN CASE OF SICKNESS, INJURY, OR DEATH OF SEAMEN (1936) 54
STAT. 1693; CONVENTION RESPECTING MINImUM AGE FOR EMPLOYE MNT OF CHILDREN
AT SEA (1936) 54 STAT. 1705.
78. Bogart v. The Steamboat John Jay, 17 How. 399 (U.S. 1854).
79. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934). After
referring to English legislation enlarging the admiralty jurisdiction of ship mort-
gages, and with a footnote to the laws of several of the states of western Europe,
Chief Justice Hughes said (at 49): "This response 'to the exigencies of commerce'
has had its counterpart in the legislation of other European States. It may be said
that the 'general maritime law' takes cognizance of mortgages of ships, provides
for their registration, and establishes rules with respect to priorities."
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The "general system of maritime law" has had some rough sailing
in the United States, as we have seen, and storms chiefly of states'
rights origin have at times compelled a little deviation. It could hardly
have been otherwise in a young nation organized on federal principles,
We may see now, nevertheless, that the main course was charted clearly
in the beginning and that it has been as steadily pursued. The vene-
rable corpus of the customs and codes of the sea had a vitality which
was not to be denied. In the result the law maritime has been received
and adjusted to federalism in a long sequence of judicial decisions. It
has been supplemented extensively by national legislation which has
been generally in basic harmony with practices prevailing elsewhere
in the maritime world. It has even been unified internationally, with
respect to some of its concerns, through participation in multipartite
treaties of legislative effect. An impressive system, it is firmly estab-
lished as a part of the national law of the United States.
IV.
The progress in judicial administration of what for convenience
we have called the law of states has encountered neither the frustra-
tions of the national law of offences nor the confusions incident to
judicial overreaching which developed so soon after the initial recourse
to a national law of merchants. Fundamentally the progress of the
law of states in the United States has been more like the parallel and
oft-related progress of the law maritime. Where differences in the
unfolding pattern are observed, there are two circumstances among
others which may have contributed something to the result.
In the first place, it is to be remembered that the law of states
was an immature law when the Constitution was adopted. While some
of its practices had their roots in a remote past, it could boast no such
antiquity, as a system, as either the law of merchants or the law mari-
time. Indeed, it had hardly arrived at the threshold of its own
systematization. Its recent development had been in response to the
requirements of an emerging European state community and in general
traced no further back than the late sixteenth or the early seventeenth
century. Grotius had authored the first attempt at comprehensive
treatment in 1625, a mere one hundred and fifty years before the
American Revolution. After Grotius there had been other treatises,
including a number which would eventually rank as classics, but even
the more realistic of the classical writers inclined at times to round
out the gaps or imperfections of their subject in some rather speculative
discourse. In the customs and treaties which had accumulated there
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was evidence enough of an emerging body of practice fairly described
as universal, but it was still amorphous.
In the second place, in understanding of all this and with a notable
foresight, the framers of the Constitution provided boldly for the law
of states by combining an impressive enumeration of defined powers
with broader generalizations calculated to serve well the more embrac-
ing purpose. As to everything external, the United States was to be
cone nation only, firmly hooped together." It was not thought suffi-
cient merely to identify a subject-matter or to include it by implication
within the broad range of a general power. War, peace, treaties,
commerce, captures, piracies and felonies on the seas, offences against
the Law of Nations, the naturalization of aliens, diplomatic and consular
intercourse, and controversies between a state or its citizens and foreign
states or their citizens or subjects were covered in express provisions.
The aggregate was well-nigh repetitious in its emphasis upon national
power. There were also broader generalizations and necessary impli-
cations which would include more. Subject only to such limitations
as were express or implicit in the American system of constitutional
government, the national power under or with respect to the law of
states would embrace, as the authors of the Declaration of Independence
had anticipated, "all other acts and things which Independent States
may of right do."
In one view, the law of states would contribute significantly to
an American conception of nationhood. In another, it would provide
an indispensable source of reference as competent national authorities
proceeded to fashion a law with respect to the conduct of international
relations. We are here concerned chiefly with the contribution of
judicial authorities. Obviously there is no space for more than a
sampling. However, if the sampling may be of matter sufficiently
typical from topics sufficiently varied, the progress of the law of states
in judicial administration may be at least fitfully illuminated. The
subject matter of our attempt at a fitfull illumination will be taken from
the law of territory, the law of nationality and the law of treaties.
There is nothing in the Constitution which provides in terms for
the acquisition of additional territory or territorial rights. It will be
recalled that Jefferson entertained doubts about the constitutionality
of the Louisiana purchase and even toyed briefly with the idea of a
constitutional amendment."0 The acquisition was consummated not-
withstanding; and it was not long after that the acquisition of Florida
from Spain was consummated by another treaty of cession. The latter
cession soon afforded Chief Justice Marshall an opportunity to for-
80. See 2 ScHrAcHNEE, THOMAS JEFFERsox, 725-726, 745-754 (1951).
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mulate broadly one of his more significant statements with respect to
the national power in matters of international concern. The American
Insurance Co. v. Canter was a case between underwriters to whom
cargo had been abandoned and a purchaser at a sale ordered by a
Florida territorial court to satisfy the claims of salvors. The principal
question was whether the territorial court was a court of competent
jurisdiction. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the argu-
ments of eminent counsel ranged widely and the Chief Justice elected
to begin the substantive part of his opinion with a dictum of enduring
consequence. "The course which the argument has taken," he said,
"will require, that, in deciding this question, the Court should take
into view the relation in which Florida stands to the United States."
He continued: "The Constitution confers absolutely on the government
of the Union, the powers of making war, and of making treaties; con-
sequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory,
either by conquest or by treaty." ,"
There is no space to detail here the progressive development in
later judicial applications or affirmations of the doctrine thus tersely
formulated in Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum. Needless to
say, the history of the United States has been a history of territorial
expansion, first across the continent, then overseas. Territorial
sovereignty unrestricted by the terms of its acquisition has come to
the United States by treaties of outright cession, by treaties for the
settlement of boundaries, by joint resolutions of Congress, and in an
instance of minor importance by exchange of diplomatic notes. Rights
of territorial sovereignty transferred for an agreed purpose or subject
to agreed limitations have come by treaty, by executive agreement, and
recently by trusteeship agreement with the United Nations. The
courts have been called upon many times to record a view of the
national power and have responded consistently in approval, given
expressly or implicitly, of the exercise of power through the procedures
invoked."2 Nor has judicial acquiescence been a mere manifestation of
81. 1 Pet. 511, 541-542 (U.S. 1828).
82. See Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 507 (U.S. 1870); United States v.
Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414, 434 (U.S. 1872); Mormon Church v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 42 (1890); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 195-196 (1901); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 300 et seq. (1901) ; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 140
(1904); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 32 (1907) ; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,
324 U.S. 652, 673 (1945). In Downes v. Bidwell (at 304), Justice White referred
to "the vast extension of the territory of the United States brought about since the
existence of the Constitution by substantially every form of acquisition known to the
law of nations." In Mornwn Church v. Uited States (at 42), justice Bradley
remarked: "The incidents of these powers are those of national sovereignty, and
belong to all independent governments. The power to make acquisitions of territory
by conquest, by treaty and by cession is an incident of national sovereignty." On
acquisition followed by relinquishment, and the effect of relinquishment upon nation-
ality, see Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1950).
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judicial caution when confronted with an exercise of political power.
It has been clear enough from the beginning that the courts have
resolved the issues presented without restraining doubts concerning this
aspect of the national power in matters of international concern.
Even before the American Insurance Co. case reached the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Marshall had found an occasion to discuss the
acquisition of territory by discovery and occupation. Herein was the
initial source of all territorial rights within the boundaries of the older
states as acknowledged in the treaty of peace with Great Britain.'
Herein was a further resource in the affirmation of national power.
By an Act of 1856, the Congress provided for the acquisition by dis-
covery and occupation of islands, rocks or keys valuable for their
deposits of guano."4 Years later the constitutionality of this act was
challenged in a case arising out of a conviction of murder committed
on an island so acquired. Sustaining the act for a unanimous Court,
Justice Gray thought it enough to say:
"By the law of nations, recognized by all civilized States,
dominion of new territory may be acquired by discovery and
occupation, as well as by cession or conquest .... This principle
affords ample warrant for the legislation of Congress concerning
guano islands." 85
There has been similar reliance upon the Law of Nations and
treaties in the business of finding judicial solution for a multiplicity
of problems arising out of territorial acquisition. It has been agreed
generally that governmental powers go with the transfer but that the
law in force in the territory transferred continues operative until
changed by the succeeding sovereign. Again, the Constitution is not
explicit; and again we find the course of judicial decision charted
initially in a notable dictum of the earlier years. It was in the same
opinion in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, referring to the "usage
of the world," that Chief justice Marshall remarked:
"On such transfer of territory, it has never been held, that the
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change.
Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new
relations are created between them, and the government which has
83. Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (U.S. 1823).
84. 11 STAT. 119 (1856), 48 U.S.C. §1411 (1946).
85. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). In support of the principle,
Justice Gray cited the treatises of Vattel, Wheaton, Halleck, Phillimore and Calvo.
The same principle has been invoked recently, in a case concerning Palmyra Island,
in support of an acquisition by Hawaii which passed thereafter by annexation to the
United States. United States v. Fullard-Leo, 133 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 748 (1943). For the later decisions with respect to vested property rights
on Palmyra, see note 89 infra.
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acquired their territory. The same Act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and
the law, which may be denominated political, is necessarily
changed, although that which regulates the intercourse, and
general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by
the newly created power of the state." s6
The broad principle thus felicitously formulated was from the Law of
Nations. It was as surely a part of national law as though it had been
incorporated in terms in the Constitution. It has since had an uninter-
rupted acceptance and a wide range of applications in the opinions of
both state and federal courts."'
It has likewise been agreed generally that, while rights in public
property go with the transfer, vested rights in private property are to
be respected by the succeeding sovereign. As much has usually been,
stipulated in the treaty or agreement by which territory has been
acquired. More mbracing principles, in the light of which both the
instrument of acquisition and national implementing legislation are to
be construed, have been elaborated in reliance upon the Law of Nations.
On occasion, indeed, there has been express or implicit reliance upon
the more embracing principles as a basis of decision. Five years after
the decision in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, another case reached
the Supreme Court on appeal from the decision of a Florida court con-
firming title to land claimed upon a Spanish grant. The case required
an interpretation and application of the treaty of cession and of statutes
enacted for the settlement of land claims in the ceded territory. Con-
cerning one of the treaty's provisions, it was observed that a restrictive
interpretation would work a wrong to individuals "condemned by the
practice of the whole civilized world." As regards another, it was
remarked that it conformed exactly to "the uniformly received doctrine
of the law of nations." The case was United States v. Percheman, in
which Chief Justice Marshall for a unanimous Court found occasion
to say:
"It may not be unworthy of remark, that it is very unusual,
even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to
displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The
modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated;
86. 1 Pet. 511, 542 (U.S. 1828).
87. See Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 542, 557 (U.S. 1854) ; United States
v. Perot, 98 U.S. 428, 430 (1878); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114
U.S. 542, 546 (1885) ; Ortega v. Lara, 202 U.S. 339, 342 (1906) ; Vilas v. City of
Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 356-358 (1911). In the latter case (at 357), it was said:
"Such a conclusion is in harmony with the settled principles of public law as declared
by this and other courts and expounded by the text books upon the laws of war
and international law."
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that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt
by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property
should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled. The
people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient
sovereign is dissolved: but their relations to each other, and their
rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be the modern
rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the
case of an amicable cession of territory? Had Florida changed
its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation respecting the
property of individuals, the right of property in all those who be-
came subjects or citizens of the new government would have been
unaffected by the change." s
It is true enough that much of what was said here was less than
strictly necessary to decision. It is no less true that there was formu-
lated in what was said a doctrine which was to be frequently and
consistently affirmed over the ensuing years as territorial expansion
brought to the courts a host of problems with respect to the effect of
transfers of territory upon property rights."9
The territorial expansion of the United States has been productive
also of an impressive body of judicial business with respect to disputed
limits or boundaries. Here there has been a development of national
law in conformity with international principles which is in important
respects unique. States of the United States have a unique position in
the federal structure and many of the boundaries now interstate have
been at some time international. Whether prompted by federalism or
by history, or both, the Supreme Court from the beginning has
resolved interstate boundary disputes in recourse to the Law of Nations.
So, where the boundary is a navigable river or other navigable water-
way, the international doctrine of the thalweg has provided an acceptable
solution. Familiar principles governing the effect of accretion and
avulsion have been as consistently applied. Principles of prescription
88. 7 Pet. 51, 86-88 (U.S. 1833). See Soulard v. United States, 4 Pet. 511
(U.S. 1830).
89.'See Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711, 734 (U.S. 1835); Jones v.
McMasters, 20 How. 8, 20 (U.S. 1857); Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 435-436
(U.S. 1838) ; United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452, 457, 458, 464 (1895) ; Maish v.
Arizona, 164 U.S. 599, 608 (1896); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 470 (1937);
United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947). In the latter case (at 269),
Justice Reed for the majority assumed that discovery and occupation "gave Hawaii
not only sovereignty over Palmyra but also the power to grant the lands of the
newly annexed islets as part of its public lands to private owners." See note 85
&tpra. Justice Reed continued: "We take judicial notice of the laws of Hawaii prior
to its annexation as a part of our domestic laws. . . . While in matters of local
law the federal courts defer to the decisions of the territorial courts, we are dealing
here with a problem of federal law-the United States seeks to quiet its title to land
now claimed by virtue of Hawaiian cession." An adverse title was quieted in private
owners on the theory of a lost grant. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
supra note 41.
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have had recognition and a rather notable development. The leading
treatises on the Law of Nations have been used freely and have provided
support for the conclusions reached."
There have been few substantive distinctions of consequence be-
tween the judicial approach to boundary problems which are interstate
and to those which are truly international; though problems of the
latter sort concerning boundaries between the United States and
neighboring nations to the north or south have reached the courts less
frequently and generally on questions of treaty interpretation. 91 On
the other hand, the maritime frontier between the United States and
nations interested in the highways and resources of the sea has become
the subject over the years of a considerable body of case law. Ports,
harbors, bays, roadsteads and the like have had occasional judicial
attention. The marginal seas, described paradoxically in recent years
as the belt of "territorial waters," have had a good deal more. Here,
as elsewhere in matters of international concern, there has been much
reliance upon the Law of Nations." The tidelands cases of current
interest are among the latest in an unfolding pattern of judicial recogni-
tion of international responsibility and corresponding national power.93
From the law of territory we may now turn to the law of nation-
ality. As is well known, the topic has had a troubled history,
particularly in the years before the Civil War. Until the Fourteenth
Amendment, relevant constitutional provisions charted no very obvious
course. The usages and agreements of nations had substantially less
to contribute. We shall observe a progress of national law, neverthe-
less, which resembles in important respects the progress hitherto ob-
served with respect to the law of territory.
Except for the legislative power vested in Congress "to establish
an uniform rule of naturalization" (Art. I, § 8, 4), the Constitution
as originally adopted was less than explicit with respect to nationality.
Along with other requirements, the representative or senator must
90. Applying the thalweg doctrine, see Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 (1893);
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906) ; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158
(1918); Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273 (1920); New Jersey v. Delaware,
291 U.S. 361 (1934). Concerning accretion and avulsion, see also Nebraska v. Iowa,
143 U.S. 359 (1892) ; Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23 (1904) ; Missouri v. Kansas,
213 U.S. 78 (1909) ; Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289 (1918). Concerning prescrip-
tion, see Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270
U.S. 295 (1926).
91. See Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138
(1934) ; Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937).
92. See Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187 (U.S. 1804); Manchester v. Massa-
chusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 J.S. 100
(1923).
93. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 804 (1947); United States v.
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 340 U.S. 899 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707, 340 U.S. 848, 900 (1950).
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have been "a citizen of the United States" for at least a minimum period
(Art. I, § 2, If 2 and Art. I, § 3, If 3). Only "a natural born citizen
of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution,"
was eligible to the office of president (Art. II, § 1, If 5). The judiciary
article referred to "citizens" of the several states (Art. III, § 2, If 1),
as did the privileges and immunities clause of the ensuing article (Art.
IV, § 2, If 1) ; and the judiciary article referred also to foreign citizens
or subjects.
4
With no more to guide, the transition from state to United States
citizenship was sure to be confused, particularly in the years of contro-
versy concerning states' rights and the slavery question. One writer
has identified the whole period before the Civil War as that in which
United States citizenship developed "from its origin as a stepchild of
state citizenship to its official emancipation from state domination by
the Fourteenth Amendment." ', It is to be observed, notwithstanding,
that the "emancipation" was anticipated in the Supreme Court long
before the Civil War-at about the time, indeed, that matters of terri-
torial acquisition and succession hitherto reviewed were before the
Court-and again with considerable discussion of the Law of Nations.
The occasions were provided by cases concerned with problems of
allegiance and alienage arising out of the Revolution and in particular
with the security of property rights of British subjects which treaties
with. Great Britain had sought to assure.96 In one of these cases, in
which the South Carolina court was reversed on writ of error, Justice
Story remarked of the rights deriving from allegiance that "Those
political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law,
applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general
principles of the law of nations." "
After the Civil War, the earlier judicial assumptions were affirmed
and the whole subject was neatly clarified in the opening sentence of
the Fourteenth Amendment: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Thirty years
later Justice Gray provided the profession with a classical commentary
on this opening sentence in his famous opinion in the case of United
States v. Wong Kim Ark. In support of a ruling that a child born
94. See also U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XI with respect to suits against a state and
U.S. Co sT. AmEND. XII with respect to the vice president's eligibility.
95. ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP, 1 (1949).
96. See Inglis v. The Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbour, 3 Pet. 99, 120-127,
154-171 (U.S. 1830); and Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 246-249 (U.S. 1830).
97. Shanks v. Dupont, id. at 248. For the states' rights view which the Court
rejected, see Justice Johnson's dissent.
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in the United States of Chinese parents, themselves ineligible to citi-
zenship, was a citizen of the United States by birth, the opinion re-
viewed the entire subject at common law and under the Constitution
in both its national and its international aspects. The ancient rule of
citizenship by birth within the dominion and subject to the jurisdiction
was found to be in complete accord with a permissive international
practice. Citizenship of the United States was indisputably the pri-
mary citizenship in this country. The amendment was "declaratory of
existing rights, and affirmative of existing law." 9
Meanwhile the United States had accumulated a spate of troubles
in its endeavors to protect naturalized citizens against the competing
claims advanced in countries of origin. Indelible allegiance was the
doctrine of the English common law. It was even more firmly en-
trenched in the law of many European nations. In the United States,
on the other hand, experience had fortified a growing conviction that
the doctrine was in fundamental conflict with principles which a nation
heavily dependent upon immigration must espouse. In 1868, the day
before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed, the
Congress by preamble declared expatriation "a natural and inherent
right of all people," by enactment repudiated for the United States
every vestige of indelible allegiance as "inconsistent with the funda-
mental principles of this government," and by further enactment
affirmed the right of naturalized citizens abroad to "the same protection
of persons and property that is accorded to native-born citizens in like
situations and circumstances." " The same year signalized the initia-
tion of what was to become a long series of conventions or treaties
designed to mitigate or remove conflicting claims to the allegiance of
naturalized citizens. In the setting so prepared, and implemented by
fiat of Congress and exercise of the treaty power, courts of the United
States would eventually become much concerned with the "right of ex-
patriation" of citizens of the United States.
The first general statute defining acts of expatriation was enacted
in 1907.11 One of its sections provided that "any American citizen
shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been natural-
ized in any foreign state.... or when he has taken an oath of allegiance
to any foreign state," and another that "any American woman who
marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband." The
constitutionality of the latter provision was first challenged in the
Supreme Court in Mackenzie v. Hare. A native-born resident
98. 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898).
99. 15 STAT. 223 (1868), 8 U.S.C. §800 (1946).
100. 34 STAT. 1228 (1907), as amended 8 U.S.C. § 801 (1946).
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American woman had married a British national here in 1909 and the
couple had continued to reside in the United States. The lady sought
by mandamus in the state courts to compel her registration as a voter.
Mandamus was denied and on writ of error the decision of the state
court was affirmed. In the Supreme Court the arguments for and
against the validity of the expatriation statute took "a wide range
through the principles of the common law and international law and
their development and change." The Court was not disposed to view
it as a case of involuntary expatriation. Rather it was a case of "a
condition voluntarily entered into, with notice of the consequences."
However much of the ancient identity of husband and wife had been
retained in deference to domestic policy, the identity had "greater
purpose and, it may be, necessity, in international policy." Said
Justice McKenna for the Court:
"As a government, the United-States is invested with all the attri-
butes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has
the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its rela-
tions and intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate
long before limiting or embarrassing such powers." 101
The deference for a particular international policy manifested in
Mackenzie v. Hare soon lost all relevance in consequence of changing
opinion with respect to the nationality of married women. 2  The
major premise of the opinion continued unquestioned, nevertheless,
and the problems multiplied. In Perkins v. Eig the Supreme Court
ruled that a child born in the United States and taken during minority
to the country of the parents' origin, the parents there resuming their
original citizenship, retained a right at majority to elect retention of
the United States citizenship acquired at birth. The Court was "fully
conscious of the problems incident to dual nationality," but to cause a
loss of citizenship by birth in the absence of statute or treaty having
that effect, said Chief Justice Hughes, "there must be voluntary action
and such action cannot be attributed to an infant* whose removal to
another country is beyond his control and who during minority is in-
capable of a binding choice." 103
There was approved in 1940 "An Act to revise and codify the
nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality
code." 104 This Act includes no less than eight separate provisions for
101. 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
102. See Act of 1922, 42 STAT. 1021; Act of 1940, §§ 317, 504, 54 STAT. 1137,
1146, 1173 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §501 et seq. (1946).
103. 307 U.S. 325, 334, 348 (1939). See Act of 1940, § 401, 54 STAT. 1137, 1168
(1940). 8 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1946). Cf. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S.
491 (1950) ; Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 135 (1952).
104. 54 STAT. 1137 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1946).
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loss of nationality by a national of the United States, whether a national
by birth or by naturalization, and additional discriminatory provisions
governing the naturalized national's loss of nationality by residence
abroad.'0 5 The statute's application has produced much judicial busi-
ness which it would serve no present purpose to review here. It is
enough to observe that within the broad limits of a permissive Law of
Nations, and subject only to internal limitations as yet imperfectly
defined, the United States has all powers of nationality, "especially
those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries."
This is not to suggest that national governmental powers with respect
to nationality are unlimited. There is no such thing as unlimited
governmental power in the United States. It is to suggest that, as in
matters arising under the treaty power to be considered presently, the
limitations are to be "ascertained in a different way." "'
By way of rounding out our sampling of the judicial approach to
problems of nationality, we should say something of aliens; and first
of their exclusion. The leading case, reported as The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, was one of exceptional hardship. A Chinese laborer had
resided lawfully in the United States for some twelve years as permitted
by treaty with China and implementing legislation. In 1887, he visited
China carrying a certificate from United States authorities which in
terms entitled him to return. Returning in 1888, he arrived in the
United States one week after the effective date of an act of Congress
which, in conflict with the prior treaty, had invalidated his certificate.
The treaty and the act of Congress were on a parity under the Consti-
tution, it was assumed, and if in clear conflict the later in time must
control. It was argued, however, that the laborer had a right to re-enter
which the Congress could not thus arbitrarily annul. To this the Court
replied that the power to exclude aliens was an incident of national
sovereignty and that the legislative decision to exercise the power was
conclusive upon the judiciary. If an international wrong had been
done, relief must be sought elsewhere and by other procedures. Said
Justice Field for an unanimous Court:
"While under our Constitution and form of goverment the great
mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United
105. Sections 401-410, 54 STAT. 1137, 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1946).
See Roche, The Loss of American Natimalty-The Development of Statutory Ex-
patriation, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 25 (1950).
106. Justice Holmes, in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). A
thoughtful student of the problem has suggested that "The legitimate end of an expa-
triation statute is to eliminate international problems of nationality by establishing
standards by which it can be determined when an American has transferred his al-
legiance to another sovereign." Roche, supra note 105, at 70. Patently the problems
of legitimate end or limitation merit more attention than they have hitherto re-
ceived.
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States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or
citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to in-
dependent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout
its entire territory. The powers to declare war, make treaties,
suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce,
secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects
of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted
in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations
of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the con-
duct of all civilized nations." 107
A few years later like reasoning prevailed in a case of expulsion.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Gray said: "The right of a nation
to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken
any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the
same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit
and prevent their entrance into the country." Again the statements of
leading commentators on the Law of Nations were reviewed, and again
it was emphasized that "The United States are a sovereign and inde-
pendent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire
control of international relations, and with all the powers of government
necessary to maintain that control and to make it effective." 108
Coming finally to the law of treaties, we are at the point of
sampling something from the law of states which had been the subject
of disillusioning experience under the Articles of Confederation, which
was much to the fore in the thinking of statesmen concerned with revi-
sion of the Articles, and which was never out of mind in the days of
the Constitutional Convention. The Constitution as adopted provided
for national authority in terms which are explicit and embracing. The
power to make treaties is vested in the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate "provided two-thirds of the Senators present
107. 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651 (1892), Justice Gray said (at 659) : "It is an accepted maxim of international
law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe. . . . In the United States this power is vested in the national govern-
ment, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of international
relations, in peace as well as in war." See Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S.
206 (1953).
108. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 711 (1892). See also
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941). On the major premise as to national
power there was no dissent in Fong Yie Ting's case; but on the further question as
to constitutional limitations upon the exercise of national power with respect to resi-
dent aliens there were vigorous and impressive dissents by Justice Brewer, Justice
Field and Chief Justice Fuller. See Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538 (1895). Cf. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
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concur" (Art. II, § 2, 1 2). The President is the sole organ of com-
munication with other nations (Art. II, § 2, 11112 and 3). Corre-
sponding powers are denied the states (Art. I, § 10, 111 1 and 3). The
judicial power extends to all cases arising under treaties (Art. III,
§ 2, 1 1) and treaties made under "the authority of the United, States"
-on a parity with the "Constitution and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof"-are the supreme law of
the land (Art. VI, § 2). In the setting reviewed hitherto, there was
thus provided a broad and firm foundation for the development of a
national law of international agreements. The details of a divided
internal authority were irrelevant. Case law would develop in a pattern
of impressive consistency.
The first of a long line of notable cases in the Supreme Court was
Ware v. Hylton. There was here presented a conflict between Vir-
ginia laws of the Revolution providing for the sequestration of debts
owed British creditors and the treaty of peace with Great Britain. The
case aroused an intense interest and was argued with rather more
attention to the Law of Nations than to a constitutional issue. Justice
Iredell appears to have struck the keynote in Circuit Court when he
remarked: "The subject of treaties, Gentlemen truly say, is to be
determined by the law of nations." In the outcome the four justices
sitting in Supreme Court concurred in declaring that the treaty must
prevail over conflicting state laws. Whatever the competence of Vir-
ginia may have been, under the Law of Nations or otherwise, the
Constitution had made the treaty the supreme law of the land.1"9
The rationalization of this result was pointed up sharply, years
later, in a contest involving alien heirs and local land which was taken
up, again from Virginia, on writ of error to the state court. A resident
Swiss subject had died intestate leaving Swiss subjects in Switzerland
as his next-of-kin. The state proceeded to escheat his Virginia lands;
the alien heirs relied upon a treaty with Switzerland which accorded
them a right to sell and withdraw the proceeds; and this, said Justice
Swayne for the Court in Hauenstein v. Lynham, was "the hinge of the
controversy." "The law of nations recognizes the liberty of every
government to give to foreigners only such rights, touching immovable
property within its territory, as it may see fit to concede," Justice
Swayne acknowledged, and in the United States "this authority is
primarily in the States where the property is situated." Nevertheless
"a treaty stipulation may be effectual to protect the land of an alien
109. 3 Dall. 199 (U.S. 1796). See CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEm MAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT, 153-160 (2d ed. 1916) ; 1 Warren, op. cit. supra note 9, 144-146. There
was no retreat from the underlying doctrine in the years of controversy concerning
states' rights. See Attorney General Cushing, in 8 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 411 (1857).
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from forfeiture by escheat under the laws of a State." The opinion
concluded:
"If the national government has not the power to do what is
done by such treaties, it cannot be done at all, for the States are
expressly forbidden to 'enter into any treaty, alliance, or con-
federation.' Const., art. 1, sect. 10 ...
"We have no doubt that this treaty is within the treaty-
making power conferred by the Constitution. And it is our duty
to give it full effect." '1o
All this was said again and more eloquently in the following dec-
ade in the even more famous case of Geofroy v. Riggs. French heirs
claimed and were held entitled to share in the inheritance of intestate
lands in the District of Columbia. With fine judicial understatement,
the opinion noted that the relevant article of the treaty with France
was "not happily drawn," and the case is perhaps significant as prece-
dent chiefly for its saving application to the treaty of principles of
liberal construction. At the same time Justice Field for the Court
summarized an approved understanding of the scope of the treaty-
making power in language which was to become classic. He said:
"That the treaty power of the United States extends to all
proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the
governments of other nations, is clear. It is also clear that the
protection which should be afforded to the citizens of one country
owning property in another, and the manner in which that prop-
erty may be transferred, devised or inherited, are fitting subjects
for such negotiation and of regulation by mutual stipulations be-
tween the two countries. As commercial intercourse increases
between different countries the residence of citizens of one country
within the territory of the other naturally follows, and the removal
of their disability from alienage to hold, transfer and inherit
property in such cases tends to promote amicable relations.
Such removal has been within the present century the frequent
subject of treaty arrangement. The treaty power, as expressed in
the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints
which are found in that instrument against the action of the
government or of its departments, and those arising from the
nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would
not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the govern-
ment or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of
the territory of the latter, without its consent .... But with these
exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions
which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the
subject of negotiation with a foreign country."
110. 100 U.S. 483, 484, 489, 490 (1879).
111. 133 U.S. 258, 266-267 (1890).
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There was nothing occult in the reasoning upon which these
opinions relied. Supplemented by opinions in a considerable miscellany
of other cases of lesser note, they need have left no major doubt con-
cerning the judicial attitude toward conflict between an exclusively
national and generally comprehensive treaty power, on the one hand,
and internal powers reserved to the states, on the other. As often as
such a conflict might be permitted to arise, the treaty must prevail.
The Supreme Court had indicated its position clearly; and at the turn
of the century respected and influential writers were beginning to
elaborate with understanding upon the judicial position."'
It required another notable case, however, to dramatize the issue
and clinch the argument. The case, as no informed professional needs
to be reminded, was Missouri v. Holland. An attempt to regulate the
killing of migratory birds within the states by act of Congress had been
adjudged unconstitutional in two district courts. Thereupon a treaty
of like objective had been concluded with Great Britain; and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act had been enacted to implement the treaty.1
3
The cause was initiated as a bill in equity by the state to prevent a
game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the
implementing act and regulations made thereunder. It was the state's
principal contention that what an act of Congress could not do unaided,
in derogation of powers reserved to the states, a treaty could not do,
and consequently that treaty and statute were void as an invasion of
rights reserved by the Tenth Amendment. This argument the Supreme
Court rejected in toto, two justices dissenting. Concerning the test
for which the state had contended, Justice Holmes for the majority
observed:
"Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or not
they cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power. Acts of
Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be
so when made under the authority of the United States. It is
open to question whether the authority of the United States means
more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. We
do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way.
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency
112. See BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1902);
and CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 109. Cf. TUCKER, LmIlTATIONS OH THE TREATY-
MAKING POWER (1915).
113. The initial attempt in Act of March 4, 1913, 37 STAT. 487, was held un-
constitutional in United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (1914), and United States
v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (1915). The treaty was proclaimed December 8, 1916,
39 STAT. 1702, and implemented by act entitled as above July 3, 1918, 40 STAT. 755
(1918), as amended 16 U.S.C. §703 (1946).
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for the national well-being that an act of Congress could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not
lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action,
ta power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every
civilized government' is not to be found." 114
Premises thus firmly established with respect to the scope of the
treaty power, the liberal construction' of treaties, and their supremacy
under the Constitution, have had other and notable applications." 5
Like premises have guided the courts as they have been called upon to
interpret and apply the less formal and somewhat more numerous sorts
of international agreements which are concluded by the executive from
time to time on its own responsibility or pursuant to an act of Con-
gress." 6 Judicial consideration of such agreements has not been fre-
quent, but when invoked has indicated indubitably that the less formal
sorts have an effect internally which is essentially like that accorded
treaties, 1 7 not because they are considered "treaties" under another
name, but rather because they are a necessary and proper means of
conducting external relations. The conduct of foreign relations be-
longs exclusively to the national government. Over the years the
Supreme Court has affirmed many times a conception of nationhood
which enables the national government to do generally the "acts and
things which Independent States may of right do." In ascertaining
what such acts and things may include, an appropriate recourse is to
the practice of nations."'
114. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Cf. Attorney General Cushing's summation in
the opinion cited supra note 109, at 415.
115. Thus these premises have been applied to avoid and supplant a municipal
ordinance which would have excluded aliens from the business of pawnbroking,
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) ; a state inheritance tax which would
have discriminated against the non-resident alien heirs of a resident alien decedent,
Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929) ; and a state succession statute which would
have escheated property left locally by a resident alien who had died intestate with-
out known heirs or next-of-kin, Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
116. See McCnmU, INTERNATIONAL ExEcUTrvE AGREEMENTS (1941); Levitan,
Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of Foreign Rela-
tioms, 35 Ii.r L. REv. 365 (1940) ; Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20
POL. Sci. Q. 385 (1905).
117. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
118. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
Justice Sutherland said (at 318): "As a member of the family of nations, the right
and power of the United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the
other members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not
completely sovereign. The power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation
(Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212), the power to expel undesirable aliens
(Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 et seq.), the power to make
such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense
(Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-601; Crandall, Treaties, Their
Making and Enforcement, 102 and note 1) ; none of which is expressly affirmed by
the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of
nationality. This the court recognized, and in each of the cases cited found the war-
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A sampling of the case law of external relations may be carried
no further, within the limits of this paper, tempting as other directions
may be. There is much case reporting on matters of sovereign im-
munity, for example, wherein the judicial consciousness of a patterned
reliance upon international usage and agreement is impressively con-
sistent. There is a profusion of reporting on matters of war and
traditional neutrality in which the same patterned reliance is strikingly
revealed. There are other areas rich in illustration; and there is of
course the whole. A treatise could have done the job better than part
of an essay, needless to confess, though hope persists that the part here
concluded may contribute something to understanding of the whole.
The generalities and necessary implications of an undistributed national
power over relations with other nations have required a vast deal of
implementing. Legislation has contributed much; treaties have con-
tributed more; and judicial administration over the years has combined
meaningful applications in a multitude of instances with much illumin-
ating rationalization. In each aspect of its enterprise, judicial ad-
ministration has been fortified by the Law of Nations, firmly established
from the beginning as a part of the national law.
V.
There is no evident need for an extended summary of this study.
Indeed, the study itself has been something of an attempt at sum-
marizing. In the earlier paper, beginning with a brief account of
Anglo-American legal tradition with respect to the Law of Nations in
the eighteenth century, we traced and in some measure endeavored to
appraise the tradition's influence upon the making of a national con-
stitution and the legislative implementing of national judicial power.
In the present paper, we have been concerned with the progress of the
Law of Nations in American judicial administration. The principal
parts of the narrative are fairly well known, at least to specialists in the
principal parts, though it is doubted that they can be fully understood
by anyone out of context or apart from the whole. Accordingly we
have endeavored to place each in relation to the whole in the overall
summation of a single narrative.
Individual offences against the Law of Nations, within reach of
federal courts administering a federal common law of crimes, became
rant for its conclusions not in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law
of nations."
Current proposals for a return to confederation by way of constitutional amend-
ment restricting the power to enter into treaties and agreements are beyond the
scope of this study. See Perlman, On Amending the Treaty Power, 52 Co.. L. Rav.
825 (1952) ; Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 H-Rv. L. RFv. 1305
(1952).
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a casualty of early political controversy. Today, with resulting un-
settlements and inconveniences long since repaired by national penal
legislation, there will perhaps be few if any to bemoan their passing.
The law merchant of the Law of Nations flourished hopefully in the
earlier years, but most of it died later in the controversies precipitated
by some extraordinary judicial overreaching. One may perhaps wonder
today whether its premises of universality were ever quite suited to
the conditions which were to develop within the United States. The
law maritime of the Law of Nations, on the other hand, has developed
substantially in the course envisaged and charted by the founding
fathers. There were factors contributing before the event, as we have
endeavored to suggest, but doubtless as important as these was the
demonstrated viability of the ancient system in response to the changing
needs of both foreign and domestic waterborne commerce in the west-
ern world. The law of states has likewise grown steadily in utility
and importance as a prime resource of national law with respect to
most matters of international concern. Though the present scope and
content of this phase or branch of our national law could hardly have
been foreseen by the most prescient of the framers, the course to be
followed was charted consciously and wisely. It has been as steadily
pursued, and of necessity, one is tempted to say, if the United States
is to maintain its place as "a part of the civilized world."
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